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THE MANY FACES OF CHAPTER 11: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BAIRD . 
A. MECHELE DICKERSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Douglas G. Baird's contribution to this symposium, The New Face of 
Chapter 11,1 employs two analytical tools that have increased in importance since 
the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code: economics and empiricism. His symposium 
article suggests that chapter 11, as we knew it, is over.Z Baird argues that chapter 11 
has a new face and performs a new role because it is no longer used to prevent a 
firm's imminent financial failure. 3 Relying both on economic theories and two 
bankruptcy databases, 4 Baird argues that large b~sinesses today use chapter 11 to 
either liquidate or to facilitate and/or consummate the sale of their assets to another 
entity, while smaller corporate reorganizations are nothing more than the personal 
bankruptcies of the self-employed owners. 5 Given this, Baird argues that corporate 
reorganizations can no longer be justified based on their ability to 'save' firms. The 
New Face then explores the increasing disparity between the bankruptcy world 
existing in written appellate court decisions and the world found in bankruptcy 
courts. Baird observes that the disconnect between those dimensions likely will 
continue and notes that, notwithstanding the impact of appellate decisions, those 
decisions are unlikely to change the nature (or face) of either the large or small 
modem business reorganization.6 
The New Face of Chapter 11 challenges scholars to view corporate 
reorganizations in a new light by forcing us to concede (or at least consider) that 
chapter 11 s current faces are not always the same ones it had in equity receiverships 
under the Act or during the early Code years. 7 That chapter 11 may look a bit 
different does not necessarily prove that chapter 11 is performing a function, that its 
new role signals the end of its old uses, that corporate reorganizations no longer 
exist, or that Congress should amend the Code to prevent the old uses of chapter 11 
'Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. 
1 Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter I I, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69 (2004) [hereinafter 
The New Face]. 
2 Some arguments made in his symposium contribution appear in recent articles Baird and a co-author 
wrote. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter I I at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673, 674 
(2003) [hereinafter Chapter I I at Twilight]; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of 
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 751 (2002) [hereinafter The End of Bankruptcy]. Thus, at times, this Essay 
responds both to the arguments raised in his symposium contribution and to those raised in these recent 
works. 
3 The New Face, supra, note 1, at 74, 76; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 751. 
4 Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu; Edward R. 
Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of Small Business Bankruptcies (2003) 
(unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago). 
5 See generally The New Face, supra note 1; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 751. 
6 The New Face, supra note 1, 92-99. 
7 I d.; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 756. 
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given the prevalence of these new uses. While many recent corporate 
reorganizations essentially were liquidations or total mergers/acquisitions (many of 
which included plans that were pre-negotiated by the firm's principal lenders before 
the filing), 8 some did not fit this pattern. Instead, those debtors (and their creditors, 
lenders, or investors) chose to have a bankruptcy court complete the deal. This 
suggests that a chapter 11 proceeding adds something to the pre-arranged deal that 
was not available outside a bankruptcy forum. 
While there has not been (nor does there need to be) an end to chapter 11 
simply because it uses new faces to accomplish traditional goals, The New Face's 
critique of chapter 11 makes a particularly salient point, given the scandals 
associated with many of the recent mega-chapter 11 filings.9 Baird submits that the 
people who control troubled businesses are often incompetent10 and that far too 
many large financially distressed businesses had corporate boards that appear to 
have been asleep at the wheel as conditions declined. 11 Building upori this thesis in 
another recent work, Baird issues a challenge to devise a way to dislodge 
incompetent managers at the right time. 12 This Essay accepts that challenge by 
suggesting ways to make officers and directors properly perform their fiduciary 
duties and to give creditors greater powers to dislodge incompetent or poorly 
performing managers of financially failing firms at an earlier stage. 
Part II of this Essay briefly summarizes the principle arguments raised in The 
New Face of Chapter 11 and generally argues that chapter 11 is not performing a 
new role: It is just using difference faces to perform old roles. As support for this 
argument, Part II notes that the current functions of chapter 11 (to help large firms 
efficiently liquidate or sell their assets and to help small business owners rid 
themselves of debt and re-establish themselves in business) are consistent with 
·traditional bankruptcy goals and policies. This Part also notes that some modem 
firms continue to use chapter 11 for traditional reorganizations, i.e., reorganizations 
that either have not been pre-arranged or are not complete asset sales. Moreover, it 
stresses that creditors/investors and debtors continue to embrace the relief provided 
by chapter 11, thus indicating their conclusion that this uniform corporate 
reorganization process provides ·certain benefits that simply are not available 
outside of a bankruptcy forum. 
Part III then accepts Baird's challenge to consider ways to dislodge incompetent 
managers. This Part notes that chapter 11 (or something similar) will always be 
needed because only this type of process will give creditors a realistic opportunity 
to remove poorly performing managers who typically escape ouster outside of 
bankruptcy. The Essay then proposes methods (including removing incompetent 
managers, having them supervised, fining them, and barring them from future. board 
8 See The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 752-55. 
9 For a further discussion of these scandals, see infra note 85. 
10 The New Face, supra note I, at 81; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 782. 
11 The New Face, supra note 1, at 81. 
12 The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 782. 
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service) to both give creditors and investors a way to eliminate incompetent 
managers and also afford officers and directors greater incentives to make decisions 
that are in the best interest of financially troubled businesses. 
I. THE NEW FACE OF CHAPTER 11 
A. Summary 
Baird argues that corporate reorganizations essentially are over for both large 
and small firms because chapter 11 is no longer used to prevent an imminent 
financial failure. 13 Specifically, he posits that because (1) creditors (especially the 
main lenders) have the power to control large businesses (including shutting them 
down) outside of a bankruptcy forum, (2) the modem business debtor does not have 
specialized assets that need to be kept together in a particular firm, 14 (3) going 
concern sales are possible outside of bankruptcy, 15 and (4) most corporate 
reorganizations of large firms do little more than execute pre-arranged deals, 
chapter 11 s new face does not save large businesses. 16 As for small chapter 11 s, he 
argues that they are used to help self-employed entrepreneurs (like lawyers, 
morticians, and plumbers) sort out their personal finances, not save the business. 
Because these businesses have few (if any) physical assets and the owner-manager 
likely will continue to run the same type of business regardless of what happens in 
chapter 11, Baird theorizes that these chapter 11 s do not help viable small 
businesses survive as stand-alone entities. 17 
In characterizing chapter 11 s new role for large businesses, Baird suggests that 
the modem firm uses corporate reorganizations under chapter 11 to facilitate or 
consummate the sale of a firm's assets to another entity. 18 He posits that because the 
modem corporate reorganization does not serve as a collective forum that allows 
creditors to decide the future shape of a financially troubled firm, and because 
chapter 11 was designed to accomplish just that goal, the new face of chapter 11 
signals the end of corporate reorganizations. In reaching this conclusion, Baird 
relies on both the paradigmatic example of a firm that historically reorganized in 
.bankruptcy (the nineteenth-century railroad) and more recent empirical data 
involving modem corporate debtors. 19 Baird juxtaposes the characteristics of the 
railroad filings against the characteristics of the telecommunications and "dot-com" 
filings, obserVing that the new use of corporate reorganizations does not resemble 
its old use.20 The old face of chapter 11, Baird suggests, addressed the financial 
13 The New Face, supra note 1, at 74, 76; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 751. 
14 The New Face, supra note 1, at 70--75; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 752, 768. 
15 The New Face, supra note 1, at 75; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 777, 786. 
16 The New Face, supra note 1, at 76; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 752, 788. 
17 The New Face, supra note 1, at 83-88. 
18 !d.; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 751. 
19 The New Face, supra note 1, at 71, 78; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 758-60, 779-80. 
20 The New Face, supra note 1, at 71, 78; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 780--81, 787. 
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problems facing firms with assets that had firm-specific value (like raqroads with 
iron rails and wooden ties connecting two cities). These firms needed to reorganize 
in bankruptcy and preserve their assets for use in their current form because the 
assets had little value outside of the existing entity.21 
Baird's conclusion about chapter 11 s new face grows from his view that 
corporate reorganizations were designed to help firms who lacked coherent capital 
structures. Only those types of entities needed the relief provided in a bankruptcy 
forum because they could not easily be restructured under applicable contract law. 
Again, using the railroad example, Baird observes that railroads possessed primitive 
capital structures i.e., they had an incoherent capital structure with different types of 
investors and there was no single individual or group of individuals who could 
amass the funds necessary to buy the railroad.22 Baird argues that the old type of 
asset-specific firm needed a collective forum to assemble their creditors and 
preserve their assets in an ongoing entity. This type of firm no longer exists, he 
posits; because the modem large business either has hard assets that donot have to 
be dedicated to a particular firm or has intangible assets that do not reside in the 
firm. 23 
Relying largely on empirical data, The New Face examines the types of assets 
. owned by firms who recently have filed for corporate reorganizations and concludes 
that those assets can be (and have been) easily bought, sold, or leased by other 
companies. Because those assets are not firm specific, Baird concludes there is no 
need to reorganize the firm and keep it together post-petition because there is no 
firm value that needs to be preserved?4 Indeed, The New Face concludes that the 
primary assets modem firms have are intangible (like intellectual property) or 
consist of workers' specialized expertise (i.e., human capital) and that these assets 
often can be used by firms within the same industry and do not need to be preserved 
in the filing company?5 In addition, The New Face indicates that many large 
corporate filings involved debtors who were a collection of discrete individual 
businesses (like movie theatres, nursing homes, or hotels) whose assets easily could 
be sold piecemeal without destroying the value of the individual businesses. 26 
Baird's premise that the new face of chapter 11 signals the end of large 
corporate reorganizations relies heavily on his view that once a large business is in 
distress and in default outside of bankruptcy, creditors (principally the firm's 
primary lenders) acquire the right to control the firm. 27 These control rights may 
include the right to fire managers, hire turnaround specialists, or otherwise conduct 
21 The New Face, supra note l, at 78; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 758-59. 
22 See The New Face, supra note I, at 75; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 779. 
23 See The New Face, supra note 1, at 78, 88; The End of Bankntptcy, supra note 2, at 762--63. 
24 See The New Face, supra note 1, at 78; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 762, 767-68. 
25 See The New Face, supra note I, at 87; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 763. 
26 See The New Face, supra note 1, at 78-79. 
n . See id., at 76, 80, 81; The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 779. 
2004] THE MANY FACES OF CHAPTER 11 113 
a market sale that shuts down or radically alters the firm's operating structure.28 As 
support for the conclusion that chapter 11 now serves as the principal forum to 
conduct a market sale of a large firm's assets (and does not serve as a substitute for 
a market sale), The New Face points to the recent increase in the number of pre-
packaged bankruptcies, and filings involving firms who entered bankruptcy 
proceedings with the sole intent of selling the firm as a going concern, i.e., the pre-
negotiated bankruptcy. 29 Because many of the recent large chapter 11 filings 
involve firms whose creditors had largely decided the firm's fate before the filing-
a change from the Act and early Code chapter practice-Baird questions the 
continued validity of (or need for) chapter 11 to bring all stakeholders to the 
bargaining table to decide the fate oflarge businesses.30 
With respect to small businesses, The New Face argues that chapter 11 no 
longer gives creditors the ability to control the fate of those businesses because 
there really is no business: There are few employees and, in many instances, no 
physical assets at all. The primary assets of a small business debtor often consist of 
workers' specialized expertise (i.e., human capital). In this situation, the business 
(regardless of its corporate form) is actually the relationships, contracts, and 
contacts the owner-manager has with customers. Though the corporate form is 
likely to disappear in chapter 11, that business will continue to exist because the 
owner-manager will likely stay in business by operating under a new name or 
corporate identity. Given this, The New Face maintains that the financial failure of 
a business's corporate form has no effect on its ·future business opportunities 
because the business is, in reality, nothing more than the know-how of the owner-
operator.31 
Finally, The New Face suggests that there is a vast gulf between the day-to-day 
bankruptcy practice found in bankruptcy courts and the practice as reflected in 
written appellate opinions. To highlight this disconnect, Baird cites Code section 
1125's regulation of a party's attempt to solicit votes for a plan and court 
interpretations of that provision and contrasts that to the increasingly common 
practice of creditors pre-negotiating the terms of the large business reorganization 
28 See The New Face, supra note 1, at 81; The End of Bankroptcy, supra note 2, at 782. In The End of 
Bankntptcy, Baird and Rasmussen contend that because of the increased use of security arrangements (like 
revolving or secured credit facilities) both inside and outside bankruptcy, a firm's lenders-not its 
managers--control the firm once it becomes fmancially troubled. The authors describe a secured credit 
facility as one which gives the lead lender control of the debtor's cash collateral, gives the debtor access to 
cash only pursuant to a prescribed formula, and lets the lender terminate the arrangement and shut down the 
firm if there is a default (which the lender can declare if it has reasonable grounds to be concerned about its 
security). Id. at 784. Indeed, while they note that the fear that creditors will irrationally or inappropriately 
exercise these rights lies at the heart of reorganization law, they dismiss that fear based largely on their 
underlying belief that creditors and investors make sensible decisions about a fmancially troubled firm's fate 
outside of a bankruptcy forum. I d. at 779. 
29 The New Face, supra note I, at 76; The End of Bankroptcy, supra note 2, at 786-87. 
30 In The New Face of Chapter 11, Baird indicates that companies including Global Crossing, Comdisco, 
XO Communications, McLeodUSA, Budget, Unicapital, Exodus, and Iridium used the bankruptcy courts as 
a way of selling their assets. See The New Face, supra note I, at 73 n.13. 
31 Jd. at 86. 
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in chapter 11.32 Baird also notes the relative willingness (at least by some courts) to 
approve critical vendor motions under the doctrine of necessity (notwithstanding the 
absence of Code authority for such motions) and contrasts that with the likelihood 
that appellate courts will conclude that such motions cannot. be authorized under 
section 105.33 
B. Chapter 11 s Many Faces 
1. The New Faces of Chapter 11 Are Not Inconsistent With Chapter 11 s 
Multiple Goals 
Baird's conclusion that the old face of chapter 11 provided a collective and 
exclusive forum for a firm's stakeholders to negotiate amongst themselves to save a 
financially troubled firm is, of course, correct. However, saving firms has never 
been the only goal of chapter 11. Though initially controversial and not 
confirmable under the Act,34 chapter 11 liquidating plans have been confirmed 
despite the objection of creditors ever since the Code went into effect. 35 Legislative 
history indicates that chapter 11 was designed to give corporate debtors a period 
during which they could decide whether the firm could (or should) be reorganized, 
or whether they should be liquidated efficiently and in an orderly fashion.36 Indeed, 
the Code explicitly provides for the sale of all or part of a debtor's assets in a 
32 !d. at 93. 
33 !d. at 96--97. I have suggested in another context that one way to resolve critical vendor motion disputes 
is to incorporate specific factors in the Code to guide courts' decisions. See A. Mechele Dickerson, 
Approving Employee Retention and Severance Plans: Judicial Decisionmaking Run Amuck? 11 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 93 (2003) [hereinafter Judicial Decisionmaking]. 
34 See Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-296, § 141, 52 Stat 840, 887 (1938) (stating judges could reject 
reorganization plan if they believed bankruptcy petition filed in bad faith); McKeown Act, Pub. L. No. 73-
296 § 77B(a), 48 Stat 911, 912 (1934) (stating same); see also John Anderson & Peter Wright, Liquidating 
Plans of Reorganization, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29, 34 (1982) (providing arguments to deny availability of 
liauidation under Chandler Act). 
~ 5 For example, investors an'd creditors in In re Coastal Equities, Inc. objected to the confirmation of a 
liquidating plan that was designed to sell the estate's assets then pay certain investors. 33 B.R. 898 (Bankr. 
S.D. Cal. 1983). The court agreed that chapter 11 is titled "Reorganization," but then stressed that the Code 
specifically provides for the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a debtor and the distribution of the 
proceeds among the creditors. !d. at 904; see also In re Searles Castle Enters., Inc., 17 B.R. 440, 442 (B.A.P. 
1st Cir. 1982) (holding creditors' contention that chapter 11 does not provide for full sale of debtor's assets to 
be without merit); In re East Redley Corp., 20 B.R. 612, 614 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (confirming liquidation 
plan despite rejection by class of creditors); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 3 70 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) 
(stating primary focus of chapter 11 proceeding is reorganization but noting liquidation plans can be 
confirmed when requested by debtor or necessitated by justice); In re Alves Photo Serv., Inc., 6 B.R. 690, 
695 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (confirming chapter 11 proceeding and denying conversion to chapter 7 
proceeding over creditors' objections). 
36 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, § 1123 (1977) (stating chapter II plan may propose sale of all or 
substantially all property of estate, and distribute proceeds of sale among creditors and equity security 
holders, i.e., liquidation plan); see also NLRB v. Bildisco 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (stating main purpose of 
reorganization is to preserve jobs and economic resources and not to liquidate debtor); In re Ionosphere 
Clubs Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (determining paramount goal of chapter 11 is debtor 
rehabilitation). 
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chapter 11 proceeding.37 Stated differently, chapter 11 (unlike its predecessor under 
the Bankruptcy Act) has never been restricted to being used solely to reorganize an 
ailing firm; an efficient liquidation has always been a legitimate use of chapter 11. 
The goal has always been to maximize value, which may be accomplished either 
through reorganization or orderly liquidation. 38 
Though the goal of chapter 11 has not changed, its new face for large 
businesses is now one which helps those firms implement a pre-arranged merger or 
acquisition.39 The New Face relies on an extensive empirical database to conclude 
that large firms use chapter 11 to effectuate total asset sales40 and that these firms 
37 See 11 U.S.C. § ll23(a)(5)(D) (2002) (authorizing sale of all or part of debtor's assets in chapter 11 
proceeding). See e.g., Danny Thomas Props. II Ltd. P'ship v. Beal Bank, S.S.B. (In re Danny Thomas Props. 
II Ltd.) 241 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating sale of assets is proper part of reorganization plan). 
38 For appellate court decisions that explicitly discuss and agree that liquidation is an appropriate use of 
chapter 11, see In re Jartran Inc., 886 F.2d 859, 866-67 (7th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging liquidation in 
chapter 11); In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881 F.2d 1346, 1352 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting "although chapter 
11 is titled 'Reorganization,' a plan may result in the liquidation of the debtor"). 
39 Recent filings that took place only after the debtor pre-arranged a deal with new investors include those 
for Aurora, Budget, Conseco, Rand McNally, Global Crossing, and McLeodUSA. See The New Face, supra 
note 1; see also Budget Group Inc. Said Monday it had Filed for Chapter I I Bankruptcy Protection in the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, UNITED PRESS INT., July 29, 2002; Lending Unit Sale Set as Revamp of Conseco 
Begins, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2002, at N3, available at 2002 WL 104498338 (discussing Conseco 
restructuring plan selling lending unit to CFN Investment holdings); Andrew Backover, Global Crossing 
Files for Chapter 11, USA TODAY, Jan. 29,2002, at lB, available at 2002 WL 4717912; Thomas Lee, 
Aurora Will Declare Bankruptcy; After Quick Exit, Investment Firm Would Buy Stake, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 3, 2003, at Bl; Ameet Sachdev, Rand McNally Gives Up Control in Restructuring; Buyout 
Firm Deal Eases Debt Burden, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 2003, at Nl, available at 2003 WL 9692780 
(emphasizing prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy plan where Rand McNally turns over ownership stake to 
buyout fum); Dan Stancavish, Chap. I I Plan Gives Firm Control of McLeodUSA, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2002, at 57, available at 2002 WL 6446075 (discussing filed prepackaged plan which eliminates debt and 
relinquishes control to buyout fum); Dan Stancavish, Global Crossing Files for Ch. I I Bankruptcy, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at Financial, 47, available at 2002 WL 6445969 (chronicling take over plan by 
international conglomerate). 
4
° Filings where the debtor's assets were sold entirely include Bethlehem Steel, Integrated Health Care, 
LTV, Fleming, TWA, Stroud's PSINet, Macy's, and Budget. See Mergers and Acquisitions: Cendant to Buy 
Bankrupt Budget Group, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Aug. 22, 2002, at 652El; Sara Bongiorni, 
Grocery Supplier to Close, Kill Jobs, STATE-TIMES/MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, LA), June 14, 
2003; Terence Chea, PSINet Continues Selling Operations, WASH. POST, June 21, 2001, at E05, available at 
2001 WL 23175671 (same); Brent Feigner, This Time it's Over: Strouds to Liquidate, HOME TEXTILES 
TODAY, May 26, 2003; Kirstin Downey Grimsley & Sharon Walsh, Federated-Macy Merger Under 
Investigation, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1994, at Fl, available at 1994 WL· 2433005 (reporting joint 
reorganization plan intended to pull Macy's out of bankruptcy); James P. Miller, LTV Sells its Steel Assets to 
Investor; WL Ross Says it Will Reopen Firm's Plants, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2002, at N2, available at 2002 
WL 2628451 (chronicling sale of assets to distressed property investor); Yuki Noguchi, PSINet Investors 
Seek Settlement; Bankruptcy Court Approval Needed on $17.8 Million Deal, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at 
E05, available at 2003 WL 17424987 (discussing sale of assets); M. William Salganik, IHS Suitors Reach a 
Deal; THI Would Run Chain, Briarwood Would Own it; Snow Created Time to Think; Proposal Needs OK 
of Bankruptcy Court, BALT. SUN, Feb. 25, 2003, at lD, available at2003 WL 14671640 (reporting total sale 
of assets after filing); Gus G. Sentementes, Judge Approves Sale of Bethlehem Steel to Rival, BALT. SUN, 
Apr. 23, 2003, at lD; Frank Swoboda & Don Phillips, American Airlines Plans to Buy TWA, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 8, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2534969 (discussing total sale of TWA assets). 
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increasingly use pre-packaged bankruptcies.41 However, firms continue to use 
chapter 11 to reorganize in the more traditional sense of restructuring their balance 
sheet by eliminating expenses, streamlining operations, and remaining in business.42 
Because chapter 11 was intended to give companies an opportunity to either 
liquidate or reorganize, the fact that its new face may be primarily one of 
liquidation does not mean that Congress should amend the Code to mandate that 
chapter 11 be used only to sell a firm's assets to the highest bidder.43 
That small business owners use chapter 11 to discharge corporate debt even 
though they have no intention of saving the business is not a new or unique use of 
chapter 11. Even the earliest bankruptcy laws were used to allow small business 
owners who found themselves strapped with debt to discharge those debts.44 After 
ridding themselves of those restrictions, such small merchants could then continue 
41 See The New Face, supra note I; see also United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton (In reUnited Artists 
Theatre Co.), 315 F.3d 2I7, 224 (3d Cir. 2003) (contrasting prepackaged bankruptcies from traditional 
chapter II cases); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 232 (Princeton Univ. Press 200I) (commenting on increased use of pre-packaged bankruptcy 
filings by major corporations). 
42 Recent examples of firms who filed for bankruptcy with the stated goal of reorganizing by restructuring 
include Adelphia Communications, Conseco, NTL, Inc., United Airlines, Worldcom, US Airways, Mattress 
Discounters, and Kmart. See Monday Morning, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 200\ at El; NTL Files Words 
Largest Debt Default, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at Business, Part 3, 4; Keith L. Alexander, United Plans to 
File Today for Chapter 11, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2002, at AI; Conseco Files for Protection, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 18, 2002, at E2; Sallie Hofmeister, Adelphia Submits Bankruptcy Filing, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at 
Business, Part 3, I; James F. Peltz, U.S. Airways Files for Bankruptcy Reorganization, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 
2002, at Part I, I; Steven Theobald, Kmart Shields 1tselffrom Creditors, TORONTO STAR, January 23, 2002, 
at News 12; Jon Van, Worldcom Files for Bankruptcy, CHI. TRIB., July 22,2002, at CNI; see also Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Reply to Baird and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 
STAN. L. REv. 645,647 n.ll (2003) [hereinafter Nature of the Firm]. 
While some of these businesses had pre-negotiated plans, the purpose of the filing was to maintain, not 
liquidate, the business. Indeed, in citing these examples, I do not necessarily mean to suggest that most large 
corporations enter chapter II without having arranged some sort of deal with their primary lenders. Instead, 
I cite these to show that chapter 11 can still be justified, in part, based on its ability to give businesses who 
have not yet arranged a deal with their creditors breathing space to decide how to restructure (not liquidate) 
and to allow them to take advantage of certain bankruptcy rules that are not available under applicable state 
laws. Finally, there are older filings (including Federated Department Stores) that could be cited as 
"traditional" chapter lis but are not since The New Face relies principally on 2002 cases: 
43 Though Baird's earlier works indicate his preference for using corporate reorganizations to maximize 
creditor interests by selling the firm's assets piecemeal, The New Face does not argue that chapter II should 
be a liquidation proceeding exclusively. See infra note 96; see also Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in 
Chapter 11, 36 J. L. & ECON. 633, 663 (1993) (theorizing "chapter 11 is simply station to eventual 
liquidation."); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 
128 (1986) [hereinafter The Uneasy Case] (reasoning liquidation is most often chosen because it is rarely 
more optimal than reorganization). 
44 TERESA A. ·SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, AND JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR 
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 120 (1989) [hereinafter AS WE FORGIVE] 
(noting earlier bankruptcy and state debtor-creditor laws focused on entrepreneurs and once prototype 
debtors were failed merchants who needed to file bankruptcy to start new businesses); Charles Jordan Tabb, 
The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR: INST. L. REV 5, 14 (1995) 
[hereinafter History of Bankruptcy Laws] (discussing Bankruptcy Act of 1800 limitation of bankruptcy relief 
to merchants). See generally Stacy L. Daly, Post-Petition Earnings and Individual Chapter 11 Debtors: 
Avoiding a Head Start, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745 (2000). 
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their same trades, a practice similar to what The New Face suggests takes place now 
with small business filings.45 It is not surprising that small business owners use 
chapter 11 to rearrange their personal finances because the owner has often 
personally guaranteed the business debt.46 Without chapter 11, it would be virtually 
impossible for the owner to continue his trade (as a lawyer, chiropractor, plumber, 
etc ... ) or to start another small business (like an insurance company or funeral 
home) unless he could discharge the business debts before attempting to sort out his 
personal debts. 
2. Bankruptcy Provides Needed Relief Unavailable in Other Forums 
By characterizing chapter 11 as a forum designed to help large businesses with 
specialized assets that need to remain in the firm (but who have not worked out a 
pre-petition deal to effectuate an ongoing sale), The New Face of Chapter 11 fails to 
adequately address the fact that large corporate debtors and their creditors or new 
investors (who often insist on the chapter 11 filing)47 seem to have concluded that 
they need chapter 11 because it provides certain types of relief that simply are 
unavailable outside bankruptcy. Though The New Face correctly asserts that many 
of the large corporate filings have been pre-arranged, it does not address why 
corporate debtors and their primary lenders increasingly conclude that they must 
use chapter 11 to close the pre-arranged deal.48 If, as Baird contends, creditors can 
exercise control rights over the firm that would enable them to sell assets or replace 
management, it is unclear how any large business would ever be able to file chapter 
11 over the objection of its creditors or why any large lender would demand that the 
firm file for chapter 11. 
While it is theoretically possible for a creditor to seize the assets of a financially 
troubled firm and sell those assets to a competitor or investor, such sales will rarely 
occur for several reasons. Depressed economic conditions or membership in an 
industry suffering from financial distress generally will preclude such sales.49 For 
45 See History of Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 44, at 15 (stating high-rolling speculators sometimes used 
bankruptcy to discharge debts then start their operations anew). But see Randolph J. Hines, Business 
Bankruptcy Aspects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 6 NORTON-BLA 1 (200 I) (discussing obstacles small 
business owners encounter in rehabilitating under chapter .1 1 ). 
46 See The New Face, supra note 1; see also AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 44, at 120; Teresa A. Sullivan, 
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Folklore and Facts: A Preliminary Report from the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 309 (1986) (providing statistics on small 
businesses and their corresponding debts). 
47 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 153-54 (1990); David A. 
Skeel, Jr., What's So Bad About Delaware?, 54 V AND. L. REV. 309, 311 (2001); Ian Johnson, Macy Gives 
Cool Reception to Suitor, BALT. SUN, Jan. 4, 1994, at 9C. 
48 Baird suggests in another work that the number of large chapter 11 s may have increased because chapter 
11 allows for sales of assets with clean title and permits senior creditors to extinguish equity interests. 
Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 2, at 675 n.6. · 
49 See Francis G. Conrad, Development: Dot.Coms in Bankruptcy Valuations Under Title 11 or 
www.Snipehunt.com in the Dark.noreorglnoassets.com, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. ·L. REv. 417, 418-19 (2001) 
118 ABILA W REVIEW [Vol. 12: 109 
example, assume the debtor is in an industry (perhaps telecommunications) where 
all other members face fiscal difficulties (or are otherwise financially unable to 
expand their business operations) or the economy is so distressed that potential 
investors do not possess or cannot raise sufficient capital to purchase the debtor's 
assets. In this hypothetical business climate, the market for the debtor's assets 
simply does not exist even assuming the firm's creditors contracted for the right to 
control the business once in default. Any sale that occurs during an economic 
downturn will likely yield an amount significantly lower than the actual value of the 
assets if the potential buyers are unable to borrow funds sufficient to pay the full 
value of those assets. Moreover, even if a willing buyer with sufficient capital 
exists, it is likely that the time it would take to find this buyer may prevent the 
debtor from being able to preserve the value ofthe firm. 5° Finally, a non-bankruptcy 
sale likely will occur only if one creditor has the right to control the firm. If there is 
more than one major ·lender or creditor, then some type of organized proceeding 
will be needed to force all parties to reach an agreement concerning the firm's 
financial future. 51 
Another benefit of sales in bankruptcy is that all the debtor's assets may be sold 
at the same time without the cumbersome proceedings often required by non-
bankruptcy law. Under non-bankruptcy law, personal property can be (and often is) 
sold in a private sale as long as it is commercially reasonable52 while state laws 
typically require that non-bankruptcy sales of real property be by foreclosure, often 
at a public auction. 53 Public sales can be expensive and lengthy and frequently 
(describing plight of dot.com industry and frequency of chapter 11 filings);.Robert K. Rasmussen & David 
A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 109 
(1995) [hereinafter Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy] (recognizing limitations of market 
apfuroach to valuing firm's assets if debtor's competitors also are. in distress). 
0 My thanks to Benjamin C. Ackerly, counsel to NTelos (a telecommunications company filing for relief 
under chapter 11 in 2003) for providing these insights. 
51 See Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 49, at 110 (recognizing limitation of 
certain contract theories to multi-creditor firms and conceding "[o]nce we move to three-party bargaining, 
the possibility of bargaining failure increases dramatically."); Riva D. Atlas, U-Haul's Parent Finds Equity 
Gains in Bankruptcy, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 20, 2003, at C1 (reporting Chair of Amerco concluded company had 
to file for bankruptcy because interests of debtor's creditors "were too diverse to reach an agreement outside 
bankruptcy court/'); see also Nature of the Firm, supra note 42, at 662 ("Large, public firms generally have 
multiple layers of debt and equity, each with a different priority in the assets of the firm .... Because these 
investors have different priorities, their interests conflict with those of each other and those of the firm."). 
52 See U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (2000) ("If commercially reasonable, a secured party may dispose of collateral by 
public or private proceedings."). See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 7-9A-610(b) (2003) ("Every aspeCt of a disposition 
of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place and other terms, must be commercially 
reasonable."); CAL. COM. CODE§ 9610(b) (Deering 2003) (stating same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-610 
(2003) (stating same); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-610 (Mitchie 2003) (stating same). 
53 See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 35-10-3 (2003) (stating grantee or assignee may foreclose property "by selling 
[it] for cash at the courthouse door of the county where the property is situated, to the highest bidder."); 
MINN. STAT. § 580.06 (2002) ("The sale shall be made by the sheriff or the sheriffs deputy at public venue 
to the highest bidder."); OR. REV. STAT:§ 86.755(1) (2001) ("The trustee may sell the property in one parcel 
or in separate parcels and shall sell the parcel or parcels at auction to the highest bidder for cash."); W. VA. 
CODE§ 38-1-3 (2003) (stating grantor may "sell the property conveyed by the deed, or so much thereof as 
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entail a cumbersome notice procedure. 54 Keeping a financially distressed firm 
afloat, while both complying with the notice requirements and coordinating private 
and public sales outside of bankruptcy, is especially difficult because the firm lacks 
the benefit of an automatic stay to prevent other creditors from dismantling the firm 
while it attempts to sell its assets. A final advantage to bankruptcy sales is that they 
allow the debtor to sell its assets free and clear of existing liens, something that 
generally is not possible outside ofbankruptcy.55 
The Code also allows debtors to increase their assets and eliminate debts in 
ways that do not exist outside bankruptcy. One primary benefit of filing for 
bankruptcy is that it gives d"'ebtors the protection of the automatic stay, which 
prevents creditors from seizing the debtors' assets and also prevents landlords from 
immediately removing debtors from leased premises (something that is especially 
beneficial for small businesses).56 In addition, the Code permits both small and 
large businesses to efficiently breach leases and contracts. 57 Indeed, many of the 
larger retail debtors used chapter 11 to rid themselves of unprofitable store leases 
(or to sell profitable leases to a non-debtor party and keep the profits from the 
sale).58 Likewise, many companies take advantage of bankruptcy laws that permit 
may be necessary, at public auction."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-106 (Mitchie 2003) ("The sale shall be at 
public venue, [sic] at the front door of the courthouse."). 
54 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.040 (2003) (describing procedure and notice requirements, 
including exact mandatory notices, for deed of trust foreclosure in Washington); see also Carl S. Bjerre, 
International Project Finance Transactions: Selected Issues Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
261, 309-10 (1999) (stating requirements for foreclosure are often expensive and time consuming); 
Georgina W. Kwan, Mortgagor Protection Laws: A Proposal for Mortgage Foreclosure Reform in Hawaii, 
24 HAWAII L. REV. 245, 253 (2001) (stating judicial sale can be very expensive and lengthy process). 
55 See II U.S.C. § 363(f) (2002) (stating trustee may sell § 363(a)(b) property "free and clear of any 
interest in such property" subject to enumerated conditions and limitations); see EEOC v. Knox-Schillinger 
(In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 322 F.3d 283, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2003) (deciding what kind of claims 
constitute "interest in the property" under§ 363(f) and, as such, are extinguished by § 363(f) sale); M~dden 
v. La Cofske, 72 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1934) (stating under Arizona law, in case of bankruptcy, landlord's 
lien on property is ineffective); Marathon Fin. Co. v. HHC Liquidation Corp., 483 S.E.2d 757, 766 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1997) (holding word "interest" in§ 363(f) is broad enough to include restrictive covenant). 
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2002) (stating automatic stay precludes enforcement of judgment against estate 
and any act to obtain possession of property of estate). 
57 See 11 l].S.C. § 365(a) (2002) (allowing trustee to assume or reject debtor's executory contract or 
unexpired lease subject to certain limitations). 
58 Chapter 11 filings in which the debtor rejected contracts or leases include Kmart, Federated, Best, 
Spiegel, Service Merchandise Co., Inc., Macy's, and United. See Campeau Units Get Extension, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 1990, at D5 (disr;ussing landlord's unsuccessful attempt to evict Federated, its bankrupt tenant, 
based upon alleged breach of lease agreement); Kmart, Penske Agree on Closings; 550 Auto Centers to Be 
Shut Down, CHI. TRJB., Apr. II, 2002, at N3 (narrating terms of agreement between Kmart and its business 
partner Penske regarding closing of Penske's auto service centers at more than 550 Kmart locations); 
Marilyn Adams, United Gets Extra Time to Renegotiate Leases, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2003, at 3B (reporting 
United was granted extension of time to decide" which of its aircraft leases it wanted to reject); Greg Griffm, 
Outlooks Differ on United's Progress, DENY. POST, May 18, 2003, at K04 (reporting United is closing 
maintenance facilities and negotiating agreements with its aircraft lessors in effort to reduce $500M from its 
fleet costs); Danny Hakim & Leslie Kaufman, Kmart Files Bankruptcy, Largest Ever for a Retailer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at Cl (narrating analysts' predictions about Kmart's extrication from approximately 
350 leases); Roxana Kopetmnan, Bullock's Closure to Affect City but Few Shoppers; Business: The Store 
Suffered from Its Location Separate from the Main Part of the Mall. Most of Its 170 Employees Will Be Out 
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them to renegotiate collective bargaining agreements or otherwise reduce their 
obligations to their unionized workers, or to strip employees of certain pension 
rights.59 Debtors in bankruptcy also retain the right to recover preferential payments 
from credito~s that were made within a specified period before the filing,60 even 
though those creditors generally would be entitled to keep those payments under 
applicable non-bankruptcy law.61 Finally, debtors are allowed to substantively 
consolidate related corporate entities, if they can prove that it is necessary to treat 
those entities as one given the complexity of untangling intercompany claims or 
debts.62 
of Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at J1 (reporting Macy's announcement of plan to close II stores as part of 
chapter II reorganization); Mary Ellen Podmolik, Bankroptcy Filing for Retailer; Service Merchandise to 
Reorganize, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at 67 (narrating Service Merchandise Co. is planning to close 
134 stores and Texas distribution center); Lorene Yue, Spiegel to Shut 60 Eddie Bauer Shops; Action Affects 
900 Employees, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 2003, at C3 (reporting Spiegel, Inc. plans to close 81 of stores and 
rewest for extension oftini.e to decide which other store leases to reject). . 
Chapter II filings in which the debtor either rejected or radically restructured its obligations to its 
workers include Bethlehem Steel, Continental, LTV, TWA, United, and US Airways. See Daily Briefing, 
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., May 3, 2002, at F2 (stating new payment plan for Continental management 
guarantees no additional pay); TWA Moves Closer to Emerging from Chapter 11, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 17, 1993 
(reviewing concessions negotiated with TWA employees which allowed TWA to emerge from bankruptcy); 
Bloomberg News, Bethlehem Steel Can End Retiree Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at C8 (noting 
health care and life insurance benefits eliminated in course of bankruptcy proceeding); Melita Marie Garza, 
1,300 Jobs Lost with Tentative LTV Deal, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 2001, at IN (comparing old labor agreements 
with new pact providing lower wage increases and job losses); Micheline Maynard & Mary Williams Walsh, 
United Delays its Emergence from Chapter 11 Until Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2003, at Cl 
(discussing wage and benefit concessions obtained by United in course of reorganization); James P. Miller, 
Airline Industry Finally Gets a Dose of Good News, CHI. TRIB., Apr. I, 2003, at IC (detailing wage, benefits 
and workforce concessions required to pull US Airways out of bankruptcy); Dan Reed, TWA Workers Fight 
Back After Demotions, Pink Slips, USA TODAY, June 17, 2003, at Bl (chronicling disproportionate effect of 
downsizing on TWA workers). 
While many would argue that it is unfair to allow corporate debtors to use bankruptcy to terminate 
workers, that bankruptcy allows debtors to modify employment contracts helps to create a negotiating 
environment pre-petition that should force the parties to participate in realistic contract discussions. 
60 See II U.S.C. § 547 (2002) (stating debtors may recover preferential transfers). 
61 Most states will not require creditors to return preferential payments unless there is proof that the 
creditor effectively controlled the debtor and, thus, can be viewed as an insider. See Mills v. Miller Harness 
Co., 326 S.E.2d 665, 666 (Va. 1985) (noting general rule allowing debtor to prefer certain creditor over 
others is subject to exception if preferred creditor controls corporation); Public Uti!. Dist. No. I v. Wash. 
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 705 P.2d 1195, 1212 (Wash. 1985) (stating same); Tudor v. Tudor, 635 S.W.2d 93, 
94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (stating same). 
62 Though not explicitly authorized by the Code, courts often substantively consolidate the estates of 
debtors or of debtor and non-debtor entities if the debtor can establish that the entities debts and assets and 
intertwined and it would be difficult (if not impossible) to unscramble those debts or assets. See, e.g., In re 
Julien Co., 120 B.R. 930, 936-37 (Bankr. W.O. Tenn. 1990) (disapproving request for consolidation because 
court was not satisfied companies were sufficiently intertwined); In re i.R.C.C., Inc., 105 B.R. 237, 241 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (approving request for consolidation because companies are "one economic unit"). 
Worldcom's plan proposed a substantive consolidation of the holding company (WorldCom) with its primary 
subsidiary (MCI). See Bloomberg News, Judge Gives Worldcom, Creditors Time to Settle, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
9, 2003, at C3 (referring to "substantive consolidation" of WorldCom debts); Floyd Norris, MCI/nvestors 
Learn Promises can be Broken, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at Cl (noting assets ofMCI being used to pay of 
WorldCom debt). 
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Perhaps the greatest benefit that bankruptcy offers, which simply does not exist 
elsewhere, is the ability to swap debt for equity or otherwise replace old equity and 
give a controlling interest in the business debtor to new investors. The New Face 
stresses that many of the recent business filings involved creditors or new investors 
who received a majority interest in the reorganized firm and, in the process, wiped 
out the old equity interests.63 To accomplish this, the debtor needs to eliminate the 
existing owners' interest by canceling their stock.64 Chapter 11 is needed to 
accomplish this because applicable non-bankruptcy laws will not allow new 
investors to displace old equity, unless old equity is paid for its ownership interest. 
While the business could always issue new stock, these shares would be of limited 
value unless the debtor eliminates the interests of existing stockholders. In addition 
to their preference to receive valuable stock, many new outside investors (often 
bondholders or venture capitalists) often are unwilling to provide post-petition 
financing unless they are given a majority interest in and the right to control the 
firm in the future. 65 
63 See The New Face, supra note I, at 72 (discussing examples of plans which proposed to swap debt for 
equity). . 
64 See An Exit from Chapter 11, WASH. POST, Mar. II, 2002, at E2 (discussing AMF Bowling Worldwide 
and terms of its emergence from bankruptcy); Associated Press, Warnaco to Emerge from Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at C7 (stating Wamaco reorganization plan calls for pre-petition secured lenders to 
receive about $104 million in cash, $200 million in newly issued second-lien notes and more than 96 percent 
of newly issued common stock in Wamaco); Bloomberg News, Aurora Foods, Inc.: Chapter 11, New CEO 
Part of Agreement, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 2003, at 2C (stating Aurora plans to convert $400 million in 
subordinated debt and cash through pre-negotiated chapter II filing); Business: Conseco Files for 
Bankruptcy Protection, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 18, 2002, at 983G3 (stating Conseco 
will reduce debt from $6.5 billion to $1.4 billion by turning company's equity over to creditors); Soma 
Biswas, Mattress Discounters Can Sleep Easy, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 4, 2003 (stating bondholders and 
unsecured creditors will get 100% of stock in reorganized company of Mattress Discounters Corp); Thomas 
Content, Harnischfeger Given Reorganization OK; Court Approves Firm's Plan Out of Bankruptcy, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 22, 2001, at ID (stating under plans of reorganization new shares of 
common stock will be given to Hamishfeger's creditor's); Josh Friedman, Leonard Green in Deal for 
Mapmaker, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at Part 3, I (discussing plan to swap debt for equity); Nic Hopkins, 
Former NTL Chief Awarded $6.6m in Options, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 30, 2003, at Bus., 30 (indicating 
award of equity in effort to erase debt); Suzanne Kapner, Moving Fast, NTL has Plan to Reorganize, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at WI (discussing restructuring plan focused on swapping debt for equity); James P. 
Miller, U.S. Airways Exits Bankruptcy Court, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Apr. I, 2003, at Cl (stating part of 
restructuring equity in restructured company was distributed to creditors and lenders); Bob Niedt, The 
Reorganization of Penn Traffic, THE POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), May 30, 1999 (stating control of 
Penn Traffic will be with investors in exchange for loan forgiveness); Reuters, Rand McNally Leaves 
Chapter 11 Behind, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2003, at 3C (indicating company's plan designed to exchange debt 
for equity); Reuters, Sunbeam Corp.: Firm Discloses Equity Plan, U.S. Probe, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 2002, at 
2N (discussing ramifications and aspects of plan to exchange debt for equity); Ameet Sachdev, Rand 
McNally Gives Up Control in Restructuring; Buyout Firm Deal Eases Debt Burden, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 
2003, at Bus., I (stating Rand McNally turned over major ownership stake to buyout firm in effort to erase 
debt). 
65 See John M. Czametzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REv. 2939, 2982-84 (1999) (stating creditors essentially become owners and decision makers in 
reorganized firm); Michael Davis, EOTT Heads for Bankruptcy Court, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2002, at 
Bus., I (indicating company will reduce debt and give creditors control of enterprise); Douglas S. 
Nishimura, The Companies Creditor Arrangement Act and the Petroleum Industry: The Blue Range 
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Finally, chapter 11 is needed to keep effective management teams together. 
Certainly, smaller business filings rarely involve significant numbers of employees, 
and it is possible to preserve team assets outside a bankruptcy forum in certain 
highly specialized industries.66 However, without the protections afforded by the 
automatic stay and other provisions ·of the Code, a financially ailing business runs 
the risk of having its management team (which may be its most valuable asset) 
destroyed if the firm cannot be kept together.67 Reassembling such a group of 
employees who are tom apart outside bankruptcy may be difficult if any have 
departed from the area, as they would have to relocate a second time.68 
· It is plausible, of course, that telecommuting could help keep teams together 
even if members of the group have moved to different regions. Indeed, many 
American workers now telecommute,69 and telecommuting is becoming 
increasingly popular for employees in certain industries.70 It is likely that the 
Resource Corporation Proceedings, 39 ALBERTA L. REV. 35, 40-41 (2001) (stating debtor-in-possession 
financing is typically only provided if lender is assured of ranking security interest·and charge on assets). 
66 See The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 773 (citing motion picture industry as efficiently and 
consistently preserving team asset:> and arguing firms do not need to reorganize in chapter II to preserve 
value of team of key employees, as team can leave firm and take its expertise to another firm); Susan 
Christopherson & Michael Storper, The Effects of Flexible Specialization on Industrial Politics and the 
Labor Market: The Motion Picture Industry, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 331, 334 (1989) (stating motion 
pictures are rarely made by single studio and instead studio acts primarily as investor while independent 
production company organizes production). See generally Gaurang Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2000) [hereinafter Connected Contracts] (discussing general tendency to create 
temporary firms to perform discrete projects). The motion picture industry may be somewhat idiosyncratic in 
its ability to quickly reassemble teams since it does not face the same geographical barriers that most other 
industry face, as much of that industry is based in just a few California cities. 
67 See The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 776 (indicating challenge of preserving value of team once 
firm faces financial crisis and conceding turnaround firms go to great lengths to keep good management 
team intact but suggesting even if team has value, value need notbe tied to any particular firm). 
68 But cf The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 774--75 (stating human capital is largely industry 
specific by citing increased mobility of workers who have skills readily transferable to other firms within 
same industry); id. at 773 (arguing as long as team can be reassembled easily, firm which it works for at any 
moment has little value in its own right); id. at 769 (indicating even though it may be difficult to maintain 
successful team, problem is not one necessarily solved by allowing firm to reorganize in bankruptcy because 
keeping team intact is different from problem of preserving particular firm). See generally Ann Davis, Want 
Some Extra Cash? File for Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2001, at C I (stating executives at bankrupt 
companies are being awarded lucrative bonuses as incentive to stay with company); Jeff Feeley, Enron 
Offering up to $130 Million in Bankruptcy Bonuses, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 29, 2002 (stating Enron seeks 
apfgroval to offer up $130 million in effort to retain key employees). 
9 See Christine Romero, Telecommuting's Popularity on the Rise, TuLSA WORLD, July 20, 2003, at E2 
(stating national number of daily telecommuters rose 17%, to more than 28 million last year. and is expected 
to surpass 30 million by 2004). See generally Arlene Bryant, Many in Bellevue Leaving Cars Home, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 31,2000, at Bl (stating study indicated telecommuting is on rise); Don Hunt & Brian 
Edwards, A Digital World; Many Properties are Wired for the Information Age, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1998, 
at C32 (stating working from home or telecommuting is on rise). 
70 Telecommuting can be especially beneficial for parents, the disabled, and workers who live far from 
their jobs. See, e.g., Eve Tahmincioglu, By Telecommuting;Tthe Disabled Get a Key to the Office, and a Job, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, 10, at I (quoting human resource management professor who estimates 7% of 
employed people with disabilities currently work 20 hours or more from home weekly, compared with 4.1 % · 
in 1997); Carl E. Van Hom & Duke Storen, Telework and the New Workplace of the 21st Century, U.S. 
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number of telecommuting workers will increase because of its potential to save both 
time and money. 71 While certain statistics and surveys seem to indicate an increased 
acceptance of telecommuting72 as well as increased productivity by 
telecommuters, 73 it remains an unusual and non-traditional arrangement largely 
because the American workplace still values a manager's right to monitor employee 
work. This is furthered by the fact that management questions whether 
telecommuting harms cooperation among traditional workers and their 
telecommuting peers.74 Indeed, even within high tech industries (which The New 
Face suggests is now the prototype for large business debtors) telecommuting is not 
the norm.75 Given this, it is likely that the estimated 28 million full or part-time 
telecommuters 76 will continue to be overshadowed by their 141 million traditional 
labor force counterparts for quite some time. 77 
In short, reassembling a team may be impossible once members have moved to 
DEP'T OF LABOR (2000), available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/telework!pl_l.htm (reporting data concludes 
"growth of paid home-based work has been greater among workers with disabilities"). 
71 See PR Newswire, Global Survey Predicts Upsurge in Telework (July 15, 2003), available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/ m4PRN/ 2003 _July _15/ 105437281/ p2/article.jhtml?term= [hereinafter 
Global Survey] ("Last year alone, the company's teleworking employees avoided commuting over 154 
million miles to work, saving approximately 7.4 million gallons of gasoline and over 70,000 tons of carbon 
dioxide from being emitted into the air."); Romero, supra note 69, at E2 (noting Management Recruiters 
International estimates employers can save $10,000 per employee by reduced absenteeism and job retention 
costs); see also Van Horn & Storen, supra note 70 (reporting same), Press Release, Cox Business Services, 
Broadband-Enhanced Teleworking Options Fuel Work-Life Balance Growth for Americans, available at 
http://www.hy-life.com/hy-life/pressroorn/release_063003.asp (June 30, 2003) [hereinafter Work-Life 
Balance] (estimating based on absenteeism alone, employers may save 441 billion dollars from 
teleworking). 
72 See Brad Allenby et a!., Organizing Around Networks, Not Buildings 2002/2003 AT&T Employee 
Telework Research Results, available at http://www.att.com/teleworklarticle _library/survey _results_ 2003. 
html (last visited May 18, 2004); see also Van Horn & Storen, supra note 70 (stating "The ranks of 
teleworkers could increase dramatically in the coming years if technology continues to improve and if 
workers and their managers fully embrace new models of work."); Global Survey, supra note 71 ("The 
survey indicates more than 80 percent of companies worldwide expect to have employees who telework or 
work remotely in the next two years, up from 54% today."). · 
73 See Allenby eta!., supra note 72 (stating several AT&T employees are switching to virtual offices to 
increase productivity and "productivity gains are the most significant" benefits of telework); see also Work-
life Balance, supra note 71 ("According to the International Telework Association and Council (ITAC), 
teleworking reduces turnover by 20 percent on average, boosts productivity by 22 percent."). 
74 See Telecommuting Wrong and Telecommuting Right, Spherion, at http://www.spherion.com/ 
staffing/pov/telecommute.jsp (last visited May 18, 2004); see also Rauen v. U.S. Tobacco Mfg. Ltd. P'ship, 
319 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2003) (failing to recognize telecommuting as reasonable accommodation for 
disabled employees because "[t]he reason working at home is rarely a reasonable accommodation is because 
most jobs require the kind of teamwork, personal interaction, and supervision that simply cannot be had in a 
home office situation."). 
75 See, e.g., CNN.com Career Exclusive, Study: Telecommuting is a wish, not reality (Aug. 23, 2001), 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/career/trends/08/23/telecommuting/ (discussing survey by techies. 
com finding 48% of people surveyed, who were disproportionately telecommuters, actively telecommute 
and 9% describe themselves as full-time telecommuters and observing even among techies telecommuting is 
not "a hugely widespread practice."). 
76 Romero, supra note 69, at E2. 
77 See Labor Force, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK QUARTERLY, Winter 2001-02, Vol. 45, Number 4, at 37, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/200l/winter/qrto6.htm (last visited May 18, 2004). 
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take jobs in other regions, and maintaining the team from a distance by 
telecommuting is unlikely. Given this, chapter 11 is needed to maintain good 
management teams and preserve the value of this asset. 
3. Chapter 11 Is Designed To Do More Than Protect Contract Rights 
Baird's underlying premise in his symposium contribution (also a premise in 
other earlier works) appears to be that the sole purpose of chapter 11 is to maximize 
value to creditors.78 By narrowly characterizing the goal of corporate 
reorganizations as preserving specialized assets in a particular firm to increase value 
to investors or creditors, The New Face of Chapter II ignores, or at least severely 
discounts, other goals of chapter 11.79 While another recent work of Baird's 
concedes that corporate reorganizations may need to consider other interests,80 this 
work ultimately concludes that most interests can be protected by contract.81 
As others have argued in the past, while protecting creditors' interests is a major 
goal of chapter 11, it was never intended to be the sole purpose. Chapter 11 was 
intended to protect the interest of employees, taxing authorities, and tort creditors 
who may have been harmed by the firm's actions.82 While higher-ranking 
78 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution. Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987) [hereinafter Loss Distribution]. 
79 See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 33 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 333, 335 (1992) (rejecting exclusive economic analysis and arguing in favor of approach which 
considers economic and non-economic value of those affected by firm's financial crisis); see also Loss 
Distribution, supra note 78, at 820 (discussing distinctions between differing accounts of goals of chapter 
I I); cf Elizabeth Warren, Bankntptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987) (rejecting exclusive 
economic approach as one giving simple answers but avoids issues pervading resolution of real problems). 
80 See The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2 at 779 (considering rights such as cash-flow rights, control 
rights, including shifting nature of control rights). 
81 /d. at 780 (concluding law of corporate reorganizations matters only when capital structure of firm fails 
to lodge control rights in hands of someone who can exercise them competently and maintaining investment 
contracts rarely fail to allocate control sensibly, and investors will not likely agree to contracts that 
misallocate power). 
82 H.R. REP. No. 598, at 607 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5963, 6179: 
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to 
restructure its finances so that it may continue to operate, provide employees with jobs, 
pay its creditors, and produce return for its stockholders. The premise of a business 
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they 
were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. 
!d.; see Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, !54 (1998), citing NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: 
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (1997), · 566-67 ("A common refrain in discussions of Chapter II is that it is 
intended to rehabilitate businesses 'for the benefit of both debtors and creditors [and] to preserve jobs and 
other ties within communities."'); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics 
of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 553 (1999) [hereinafter Financial Characteristics] 
(noting Congress' keen awareness of how bankruptcy law may affect jobs and local communities); see also 
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter II, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 468 (1992) 
[hereinafter Untenable Case for RepeaT] ("In the hearings leading up to the 1978 Code, Congress singled out 
a number of beneficiaries of its distributional decisions, making repeated references to protecting jobs and 
saving troubled businesses."). 
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employees have both the incentive and power to protect their personal self-interests 
during the employment negotiation process, most low-level employees lack both the 
incentive and the clout to effectively bargain with their employers.83 Indeed, the 
losses lower-level Enron employees suffered demonstrates the need for a collective 
procedure to protect the interests of rank-and-file workers.84 In addition, given the 
allegations of fraud involved in many of the recent mega-filings,85 even if control 
rights are properly allocated to creditors or employees before the fraudulent acts 
take place, those who have those control rights may not be able to protect their 
interests. 86 
83 See Donald R. Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 6 (1996) 
("[ m ]ost employees accept employment on the basis of severely limited information and have little ability to 
protect themselves in advance of an employer's possible default."); see also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The 
Intersection Between US Bankruptcy and Employment Law, 10 LAB. LAW. 57, 61 (1994) (asserting 
employment contracts are rare except for "highly compensated executives who had the foresight and 
ba~aining power to secure definite-term contracts."). 
See Nancy Rivera Brooks, Enron Execs Were Paid to Remain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, sec. 3, at 3 
(contrasting average $110,000 retention bonus given to Enron executives to average $4,500 severance pay 
for lower-level workers); see also Judicial Decisionmaking, supra note 33, at 103-11 (2003) (analyzing 
responses considered by Congress to eliminate perception of inequitable treatment); Jeff St. Onge & [)aniel 
Taub, U.S. Judge OKs Enron Severance Package, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, sec. 3, at 3 (describing 
Enron's settlement with discharged employees). 
85 For example, Andrew Fastow (Enron's former chief financial officer reported to have engineered 
Enron's off-the-book partnerships) was charged with fraud, money laundering, conspiracy and obstruction of 
justice. See Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Enron Finance Chief is Indicted on 78 Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. I, 2002, 
at C2 (reporting indictment of grand jury). L. Dennis Kozlowski (former chairman and chief executive 
officer of Tyco) was criminally indicted for tax evasion, grand larceny, falsifying business records, and 
securities fraud. See David Leonhardt, Is That Your C.E.O. Cashing Out?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at Cl 
(noting Tyco executives had actually bought $45 million dollars of Tyco stock in year Kozlowsky was 
indicted). Finally, WorldCom, and Adelphia executives were arrested on fraud charges, K-Mart executives 
were accused of misrepresenting earnings and channeling millions of dollars to executives who left or were 
discharged from the company, and Conseco Inc. filed for bankruptcy while it was facing a federal 
investigation of its accounting practices. See Jennifer Dixon, Subsidiary Bought 2 Planes, Purchase Came 
Just Before Cash Ran Out, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 20, 2002, at A6 (discussing Kmart subsidiary's 
purchase of two corporate jets two months before Kmart declared bankruptcy); Kurt Eichenwald, 2 Ex-
Officials at WorldCom Are Charged in Huge Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at AI (describing charges 
brought against WorldCom executives); Jane Hoback & Gil Rudawsky, Former Conseco Exec Confident 
Firm Will Climb Out of Chapter 11, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Jan. 4, 2003, at C6 (explaining Conseco's 
filing of bankruptcy); Amy Merrick, Kmart Studied Executive Conduct as a Focus of Its Internal Probe, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A3 (giving account of Kmart's internal investigation); Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Corporate Conduct: Prosecution; Founder of Adelphia and 2 Sons Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at 
Cl (detailing charges against Adelphia executives). 
86 Similarly, while Baird and Rasmussen contend in The End of Bankruptcy that some stakeholders, like 
localities or taxing authorities, may not need to be protected by bankruptcy laws because they can protect 
their interests by contract, this protection obviously is not available to tort creditors. See The End of 
Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 780 (arguing corporate reorganizations are unnecessary when investors can 
contract to protect themselves). Many of the largest corporate filings in this country involved tort creditors 
and some (like Johns Manville and Dow Coming) filed for bankruptcy solely to resolve pending or 
increasing tort judgments. See Stuart Auerbach & Peter Behr, Stretching the U.S. Bankruptcy Laws, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 2, 1983, at G I (stating Manville Corp. ducked behind "the protective walls of the bankruptcy 
court in August 1982 - not to escape creditors, but to block the rising tide of lawsuits by the victims of 
asbestos disease."); see also Susan Harrigan, Dow Corning Files for Bankruptcy; Move Casts Doubt on 
Implant Settlement, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 16, 1995, at A35 (commenting Dow Coming's decision to file 
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C. Conclusion 
Bankruptcy, as we knew it, may no longer exist for large businesses who seek to 
reorganize under chapter 11 as a result of the changing capital structures utilized by 
many large corporations. It may not "save" many smaller businesses because the 
primary assets of those operations may be a human being and her contacts with 
other human beings (i.e. the customers). These assets likely will not remain with 
the small business debtor and will, instead, be used by another entity (controlled by 
the same person who controlled the bankrupt entity) that lacks the debts of that 
original entity. However, chapter 11s role remains one that helps large businesses 
avoid piecemeal liquidations and gives small business owners a second (or third, or 
fourth) chance to stay in business. ·Thus, while every corporate reorganization 
might not bring all stakeholders to the bargaining table to decide how to save a 
financially troubled firm, some still do and-in any event-saving firms by 
reorganizing them is but just one goal of chapter 11. Even if chapter 11 s new face 
is one that primarily liquidates firms or implements pre-negotiated deals, this does 
not mean that chapter 11s old face has disappeared or should disappear, or that 
chapter 11 no longer provides benefits that do not exist outside of bankruptcy. That 
it wears a. different face while pursuing traditional goals does not (and should not) 
mean that these new faces signal the end of the old goals or that corporate 
reorganizations are (or should be) over. 
Chapter 11, or another type of uniform federal debt reorganization process, will 
always be needed as long as firms are managed by entities other than their creditors. 
While it is unclear whether chapter 11 has new faces, or just wears new makeup on 
its old face, The New Face aptly insists that we rethink the goals of chapter 11 in 
light of its new uses. Though rethinking chapter 11 s goals does not mean there is 
(or need be) an end to bankruptcy as we know it, Baird's participation in this 
symposium undeniably makes a significant contribution to the current bankruptcy 
debate about the role of manager incompetence in afirm's financial failure. He has 
stressed in another article that, in some instances, the managers who exercise 
control rights "are simply not up to snuff' and may indeed be incompetent.87 Since 
such managers will not exercise control rights in a way that leads to sensible 
business decisions, Baird asserts that the challenge is to "devise a robust mechanism 
to dislodge them at the right time."88 Baird notes that "[i]ncentives alone do not 
ensure a successful decisionmaker" and suggests that there should be a way "to · 
allocate control rights in a way that ensures that the managers can stay when they 
perform well but are ousted when they do not. "89 The remainder of this Essay 
chapter ll petition "plunged into uncertainty" a proposed $ 4.2 billion settlement potentially involving 
400,000 claimants with Dow Coming and other breast implant makers). 
87 See The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 782. 
UM . 
89 !d. See generally Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 868 (2002) (comparing two theories on 
managerial power with respect to management's decision on executive compensation); Franklin G. Snyder, 
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suggests ways to give managers90 incentives to better protect the interests of 
financially ailing businesses and to give creditors, investors, or new owners earlier 
control rights in businesses who have filed for relief in chapter 11. 
II. USING CHAPTER 11 TO DISLODGE INCOMPETENT MANAGERS 
A. Replacing or Supervising Managers 
Managers of the chapter 11 businesses involved in the recent accounting and 
fraud scandals appear to have caused, or at least significantly contributed to, the 
firm's financial failure. 91 However, bankruptcy law is premised on the belief that 
financial failures are caused by factors that lie beyond the control of the business 
and its managers. As such, these factors cannot be predicted or explained (i.e., 
exogenous risks) and are not caused by choices the managers made (i.e., 
endogenous risks).92 For that reason, bankruptcy laws do not automatically penalize 
managers simply because a business files for bankruptcy. In contrast, some non-
bankruptcy state laws do penalize managers who intentionally engage in· acts that 
harm the company.93 However, except in a limited number of jurisdictions that 
More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 138 (2003) (stating types of 
directors usually selected to corporate boards will often put CEO's interests in front of shareholders' 
interests). 
9° For the purposes of proposals in the next section, I define manager to include both high ranking 
co:porate officers and board directors. 
9 See Hoback & Radawsky, supra note 85, at C6 (reporting Conseco filed for bankruptcy while facing 
federal investigation of its accounting practices); Merrick, supra note 85, at A3 (explaining how K-Mart 
executives created "retention loan" program gave almost $29 million to executives who left or were 
discharged from company, then fabricated true scope of program to board); Two Ex-Officials of WorldCom 
Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. II, 2002, at CIO (describing how WorldCom improperly accounted for $7 
billion in expenses leading to bankruptcy); SEC Charges Adelphia and Rigas Family with Massive Financial 
Fraud, SEC NEWS DIG., July 24, 2002, available at 2002 wL 10534992 (discilssing allegations Adelphia's 
founder and three sons used company assets as collateral for private loans, made payments for personal use, 
made extraordinary payments to family members for "services" and "products" sold to company, excluded 
billions of dollars in liabilities by concealing in off-balance sheet affiliates, and exaggerated Adelphia's 
earnings and falsified operations statistics). 
92 See The Uneasy Case, supra note 43, at 133-34 (describing traditional view of corporate 
reorganizations); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale 
L.J. 1043, 1043 (1992) (explaining how bankruptcy scholars view bankruptcy as creation of extrinsic 
factors). 
93 Directors who engage in acts of self-dealing that harm either the company or its creditors can be fined 
for breaching the duty of loyalty. For example, a director/shareholder who pays himself a salary but neglects 
to pay creditors' debts breaches his fiduciary duty to creditors. Moreover, directors consistently are deemed 
to have breached their duties to creditors if they withdraw substantially all assets from the firm without 
leaving sufficient resources to pay the firm's debts, dissipate assets, put firm assets at risk, or if they divert 
firm assets to themselves, other insiders, or preferred creditors. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-{)9 
(1939) (discussing how directors' fiduciary obligation intends to protect entire community and providing 
instances where salary claims of directors have been disallowed by court because it was not equitable to 
other creditors); Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 402 (1921) (stating corporation cannot "disable itself 
from responding" to those with valid claims by "distributing its property among its shareholders."); In re Ben 
Franklin Retail Stores, 225 B.R. 646, 655 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (explaining directors owe duty to creditors 
to not "divert, dissipate or unduly risk assets necessary to satisfy their claims."). 
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recognize the theory of deepening insolvency,94 neither bankruptcy nor applicable 
state laws penalize incompetent managers or penalize managers who fail to take 
appropriate steps to protect a firm from bankruptcy. Because the Code assumes that 
managers do not cause a firm's insolvency, domestic managers do not face the 
sanctions that directors of non-U.S. companies face, including the risk that they will 
be forced to compensate creditors for losses caused by the firm's insolvency or that 
they will be removed or disqualified from current or future board service.95 
A return to the pre-Code practice of automatically replacing the management of 
large companies when the company files for bankruptcy would be unwise because it 
would discourage managers from placing a firm under the protection of bankruptcy 
laws even when a filing clearly is in the firm's best interest.96 For the same reason, it 
would not be prudent to adopt the non-U.S. practice of automatically removing 
managers when the firm initiates an insolvency proceeding. However, as long as 
non-bankruptcy laws permit managers to run (and potentially commit fraudulent or 
· negligent acts concerning) firms, creditors will need some type of unified 
proceeding both to stop the firm from hemorrhaging and to oust incompetent 
managers. Thus, in rethinking the goals of chapter 11 and in attempting to find 
ways to help dislodge incompetent managers, we must revisit the assumption that 
managers are not primarily to blame for corporate failures. 
If managers either caused the firm's financial problems or are incompetent, then 
creditors, employees, shareholders and other parties in interest in a large business 
reorganization should have the option of having a competent outside party supervise 
or otherwise be involved with management of the firm for the following reasons: 
(1) to ensure that it should be in chapter 11 (rather than simply liquidated in a non-
bankruptcy forum); (2) to quickly remove incompetent managers; and (3) to 
94 Jurisdictions increasingly are willing to find directors or a finn's financial advisors who prolong an 
insolvent finn's corporate life by causing the finn to sink deeper into insolvency breach their fiduciary duties 
to creditors if they provide misleading financial information that either causes creditors to extend credit or 
prevents creditors from any possible recovery of their claims. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. 
R.f. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 349-50 (3d Cir. 2001) (conciuding "deo:pening insolvency" may give rise 
to cognizable injury); In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc., 269 B.R. 721, 732 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding 
fiduciary duty was owed and breached by negligent performance of services); In re Ben Franklin, 225 B.R. 
at 656 (noting directors who cause corporation to incur unnecessary debt may be liable to creditors for 
breach of duty). This theory is similar to the trading while insolvent or trading at the risk of creditors penalty 
imgosed on directors of British, Australian, Canadian and French companies. See infra note 95. 
5 Specifically, British, Australian, Canadian and French directors may be forced to contribute their 
personal assets to the finn's insolvency proceeding if they are found to have "traded while insolvent". See 
Insolvency Act, c.45, § 214 (1986) (Eng.); Australian Companies Act, § 588 (1993) (Austl.); see also 
Andrew West & Franryois-Xavier Lucas, France, in DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 38, 41,45 (Paul J. 
Omar ed., 2000) (discussing liability under French laws for losses sustained due to directors' conduct); Tracy 
C. Sandler & Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Director Liability in Canadian Insolvencies, American Bankruptcy 
Institute Annual Spring Meeting (April 18-21, 2002), available at WL 041802 ABI-CLE ·399, 414 
(discussing directors' duties in Canada). 
96 Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act mandated the automatic displacement of existing management and the 
appointment of a trustee for large companies. See I I U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (repealed 1978) (noting "[u]pon 
the approval of a petition, the judge shall, if the indebtedness of a debtor, liquidated as to the amount and not 
contingent as to liability, is $250,000 or over, appoint one or more trustees."). 
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generally help ensure that the reorganization is an efficient one. To provide a 
method to dislodge incompetent managers, to protect the control rights of creditors, 
and to give new owners earlier control rights over the reorganizing business, there 
should be a rebuttable presumption that a bankruptcy trustee or examiner will be 
appointed to supervise existing management and to determine whether they are 
competent to continue running the firm. Alternatively, a turnaround specialist or 
chief restructuring officer ("CRO") should be retained to help guide the firm 
through the bankruptcy case. If a majority of the creditors consent to having 
existing management remain in place unsupervised, then no trustee, examiner, or 
CRO should be appointed. 
Having a uniform federal reorganization proceeding supervised by a judge is 
beneficial because it provides one forum to help expose managers incompetence 
and fraud, assess their competence and conduct, then decide whether that conduct 
warrants sanctions. Even scholars who generally believe that markets (rather than 
courts) should decide how to allocate a financially ailing debtor's assets agree that 
judges are more qualified to police misbehavior by parties.97 While The New Face 
argues that the modem creditor (especially the primary lender) has increasingly 
powerful control over large businesses, it does not consider why so few creditors 
actually remove either the officers or directors of financially failing firms before the 
bankruptcy filing. While there are some instances of poorly performing managers 
being replaced at the insistence of either shareholders98 or major lenders,99 and 
shareholders increasingly are demanding greater rights to name or remove 
directors, 100 removals are rare, even m pre-negotiated or pre-packaged 
97 See, e.g., Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 49, at 92-93 (generally advocating 
market processes but conceding "[j]udges are particularly adept at policing misbehavior by the parties" and 
concluding "giving bankruptcy courts a central role in policing misbehavior is an important and appropriate 
focus of the bankruptcy laws."); see also The New Face, supra note I (observing bankruptcy judges perform 
job of weeding out meritless small business cases as well as market actors who face restraints similar to 
those facing judges). 
98 Chris Kauffmann, Two Directors Leave Marine Bank Board; Chairman Richard Bolinger Says Ned 
Curtis Left to Concentrate on His Own Company, and Robert Mac William Departed for Health Reasons, 
PRESS J., June 24, 2003, at B8 (discussing shareholder removal of nine directors); David Warsh, Swedish 
Import May be Just What Business Needs, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1993, at C4 (stating directors of IBM, Digital 
Equipment, General Motors, Salomon Brothers, and American Express resigned as result of pressure from 
big institutional investors); Barnet D. Wolf, Board of Directors; 2 Founders Return to National Century, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 30, 2003, at El (reporting shareholder removal of one of three directors); 
Courses Help Director's Sharpen Their Skills in the Boardroom, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1995, at M9 (stating 
shareholders have recently increased pressures to remove poor-performing managers). 
99 See Joe Gardyasz, Touch 1 May Sell Telemarketer, BISMARK TRIB., July 18, 1998, at Bl (noting 
Founder and CEO of Touch I replaced at request of company's secured creditors); Jeff Manning, Judge 
Dismisses Claim Ex-Wilshire Executives Improperly Got Funds; Other Charges are Still Pending in the 
Case Against Andres Wiederhorn and Larry Mendelsohn, THE OREGONIAN, July 25, 2000, at AI (explaining 
after gaining majority on board of directors, creditors fired founder and CEO of Wilshire); Brenda 
Witherspoon, Morning Briefcase, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14, 1997, at 4D (stating Mercury Finance 
had replaced its chief executive to please creditors). 
100 See Edward Iwata, Shareholders Win in Hanover Settlement, USA TODAY, May 14, 2003, at 83 
(noting as part of settlement of lawsuit, shareholders with more than 1% of company stock acquired right to 
nominate two independent directors to company's slate of candidates during proxy season); see also 
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reorganization proceedings controlled by firm lenders. In fact, the managers of the 
most recent mega-firms that filed a chapter 11 petition were not fired by creditors' 
pre-petition and were not replaced until after the filing, 101 despite the appearance of 
criminal. conduct. 102 This suggests, at least, that the control rights that creditors 
theoretically have outside of bankruptcy may not effectively protect the firm from 
incompetent managers. 
Some of the recent chapter 11 filings unfortunately suggest that creditors, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders may be unable to exercise any control rights 
they contractually bargained for if the firm's managers are operating the firm 
incompetently or fraudulently and the directors are not monitoring these managers. 
While empirical data cited in The New Face suggests that bankruptcy judges 
quickly dispose of meritless small business cases, 103 and quickly confirm plans in 
the large chapter 11 cases/04 The New Face does not address in depth the typical 
case progression for debtors whose managers are accused of either committing 
Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties. Business 
Judgment. Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. I, 55 (1989) (stating rationale for removing 
management is management's wrongful actions which increase financial losses); cf Simon Romero, El Paso 
Claims Victory in a Proxy Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at Cl (while shareholder of El Paso 
Corporation failed to replace company's current leadership with his own nominees, El Paso viewed 
shareholder action as important example of shareholders advancing their concerns over corporate 
performance). 
101 WorldCom's CEO (Bernard Ebbers) was replaced after filing in late April2002. WorldCom Pins Hopes 
on 1P Data Services. available at http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/xsp/isptelecom/ 
story/0,10801,71617,00.htrnl (last visited May 18, 2004). Likewise, the CEO of Adelphia was replaced after 
the filing in May 2002. See David Lieberman, SEC Filing Reveals Rigases' Use of Adelphia's Assets, USA 
TODAY, May 27, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/telecom/2002-05-28-adelphia.htm 
(May 28, 2002); see also Case Against Fastow Points Higher; Complaint Seen as Foundation for 
Prosecution of Top Enron Executives, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2002, at El (CEO of Enron resigned under 
pressure from creditors in Enron's bankruptcy case); Seth Schiesel, Most of Board at WorldCom Resign 
Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002, at C7 (majority of WorldCom board resigned because creditors 
committee in bankruptcy case found resignations to be absolutely essential). See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, 
Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. I, 11-12 (2002) (stating arrest of top-level executives displays 
their intimate involvement in accounting fraud). 
102 See supra note 85 and 101; Kmart Reports Evidence of Wrongdoing, available at http://money.cnn. 
com/2003/01125/newslkrnart_wrongdoing (Jan. 25, 2003) (reporting evidence of wrongdoing by top 
management prior to Kmart's chapter II filing). 
103 See The New Face, supra note I, at 89-90. See generally Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of 
Reorganizing Small Businesses in Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 181, 185 (2000) (noting 
chapter II procedures are "inefficient or too cumbersome" for successful reorganization of small 
businesses); Richard A. Greene, Recent Developments in Small Business Bankruptcy Law, 7 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING Bus. L. 215, 217 (2003) (observing "small businesses flounder in reorganization cases because 
of the expense and time needed."). 
104 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 600--01 (1993) [hereinafter Patterns in 
Reorganization] (finding 96% confirmation rate for large, public companies who reorganize); Financial 
Characteristics, supra note 82, at 500 (deeming chapter lis complex structure more suitable for businesses 
with "sufficiently large assets and debt to support an expensive restructuring."). See generally Lynn M. 
LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: 
Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 255-56 (2001) [hereinafter Race to 
the Bottom] (reporting high confirmation rates for large companies). 
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fraudulent acts or of being incompetent. 105 Unless managers agree to resign, 
however, the rigidity of existing bankruptcy rules makes it hard to replace them 
unless creditors or investors provide proof of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or 
gross negligence in management of the firm's affairs. 106 
Under the current test for appointment of a trustee, the court must find that 
current management has displayed fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross 
negligence in managing the debtor's affairs. 107 Though this gives courts the authority 
to remove incompetent managers or managers who are currently engaged in 
fraudulent acts, as The New Face observes, trustees are rarely appointed in mega-
cases largely because of concerns about the expense of such an appointment and the 
potential disruption to the business by replacing existing management. 108 Creating a 
presumption that existing management will be either replaced or supervised by a 
trustee, examiner, or CRO would not harm existing practice. Indeed, adopting this 
proposal would be consistent with recent practice in large business filings since, as 
The New Face notes, bringing in outside experts (like CROs, turnaround specialists 
or new chief operating officers) to either help or replace management is becoming 
common. 109 Moreover, existing empirical data suggest that, in any event, few 
managers survive large corporate reorganizations, 110 and that those directors who 
105 While Baird states that large businesses entering chapter II without a pre-negotiated plan take 
considerably longer than pre-negotiated or pre-packaged filings and indicates that bankruptcy judges in 
small business cases take longer to act if there is active criminal fraud, he does not otherwise discuss what 
tends to happen in cases where there are allegations of manager fraud. See The New Face, supra note I, at 
89. Baird concludes that, in general, bankruptcy judges largely sort cases correctly since meritless small 
business filings rarely linger in bankruptcy courts. /d. Given this, he suggests that it would not be wise to 
curb the judges' decision-making authority, a suggestion I raised in a recent work as well. See Judicial 
Decisionmaking, supra note 33, at 104-07 (supporting judicial discretion in retention/severance programs); 
see also Harriet Thomas Ivy, Means Testing Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999: A Flawed Means to 
a Questionable End, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 221, 242--43 (2000) (finding judicial discretion necessary in chapter 
ll cases). 
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2002). The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that the debtor will remain in 
possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1107. 
107 See 11 U.S.C. § ll04(a)(l); see also Cajun Elec. Power Co-op. v. Central La. Elec. Co., Inc. (In re 
Cajun Elec. Power Co-op.), 69 F.3d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1995) (characterizing appointing trustee as 
extraordinary remedy); In re Nautilus of N.M., Inc., 83 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1988) (placing 
burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, on party seeking removal of debtor-in-possession); In re 
William Smith Constr. Co., 77 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (stating same). See generally 7 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 1104.02[1] (Lawrence P. King. et al. 15th ed. 2002) (presuming debtor's 
managers, who are most familiar with business, best suited to run business during reorganization). 
108 See The New Face, supra note I, at 92-93; see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting trustees are exception and rarely 
exist in chapter 11); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~I 104.02[1] (2002) (characterizing appointment of chapter 
ll trustee as "extraordinary" remedy). 
109 See The New Face, supra note 1, at 81; see also Panel Discussion, The Judge's Role in Insolvency 
Proceedings: The View from the Bench; The View from the Bar, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 511, 523 
(2002) (explaining turnaround specialists are usually installed as interim management). 
no See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate 
Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 371 (1990); Stuart C. Gilson, 
Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 245 (1989); Lynn M. LoPucki & 
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held 
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669,723-24 (1993) (finding change in CEOs of large, corporate debtors in 
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have not resigned will be replaced. 111 Recent filings suggest that trend will 
continue. 112 
An additional reason to create a presumption that managers will be supervised 
and potentially replaced is that it gives the new owners quicker control over the 
company. As The New Face indicates, many corporate reorganizations are used to 
transfer ownership of a financially troubled company to a third-party. 113 Given this 
ownership change, replacing directors has become common, especially once the 
plan is confirmed. 114 Creating the presumption that officers and directors will be 
either supervised or replaced removes some control rights from the people who 
actually run the business pre-petition (and perhaps post-petition as well) and gives 
those rights to the firm's creditors, existing shareholders, or new investors 
immediately after the bankruptcy filing. 115 Because the new owners likely will 
ninety-one percent of cases studied); Patterns in Reorganization, supra note 104, at 610 (discussing rapid 
turnover of corporate managers in chapter 11 reorganizations of publicly held companies); Untenable Case 
for Repeal, supra note 82, at 449 (finding seventy-one percent of-managers of firms filing for bankruptcy 
lost their jobs). 
111 See John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 53, 83 n.99 (1995) (discussing statistics regarding replacement of board of directors); Chapter 11 at 
Twilight, supra note 2, at n.72 (citing LoPucki database indicating significant board turnover of chapter II 
businesses emerged in 2002); .Brian L. Betker et al.,. "Warm with Sunny Skies": Disclosure Statement 
Forecasts, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 809, 826 (1999) (estimating boards change 70% of members during 
reorganization). 
112 For example, after Enron filed for bankruptcy it named a corporate bankruptcy rescue specialist as its 
interim chief executive officer to replace longtime Board Chair and CEO Ken Lay, who stepped down under 
pressure from creditors. See Tom Fowler, The Fall of Enron:· Bankruptcy Expert Named Enron CEO: 
Stephen Cooper to Replace Lay, Faces Tough Task of Reorganizing Fallen Giant, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 30, 
2002, at A I. The person named as the bankruptcy rescue specialist was employed by a firm that had worked 
with other chapter II debtors, including Polaroid, Sunbeam, and Federated Department Stores. See Noelle 
Knox, New Enron CEO Turns Company Focus to Future While Workers Cope with Loss and Uncertainty, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 18, 2002, at B3. Kmart replaced its chairman and named a former Chief Operating 
.Officer (COO) of Sears, Roebuck and Co. as its President and COO (and later CEO) to fill the vacancy 
created when Kmart's President was ousted after 15 months in the job but ultimately appointed a CRO. See 
Kmart Executive To Get Millions, Jan. 24, 2002, available at http://www.clickondetroit.com; New Team 
Takes Full Command at Kmart, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 12, 2002, available at http://www.freep.com; 
see also Rachel Katz, Restructuring Kmart Names New CEO: President Julian Day Replaces James 
Adamson in Taking Firm out of Chapter II, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003; Kmart Announces Appointment of 
Senior Officers to Guide Company Through Reorganization, PR NEWSWIRE (Troy, Mich), Mar. II, 2002; 
Lorene Yue, New Head of Kmart Installs 'Heavyweight' Turnaround Team, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 12, 
2002, available at http://www.freep.com. Adelphia Communications appointed as its new Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) a person with expertise in turning around struggling companies. See Adelphia Pins Hopes on 
Turnaround Expert, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 22, 2003, at C3. Finally, after ousting its CEO, WorldCom 
hired as its CRO and CFO two executives of a restructuring firm. See Elizabeth Douglass, WorldCom Hires 
Turnaround Experts, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2002, Part 3, 3. 
113 See The New Face, supra note 1, at 74; see The Uneasy Case, supra note 43, at 127 (stating sale of 
ownership rights to third-party is common form of bankruptcy proceeding); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law 
and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 723, 768 (1997-1998) 
(discussing advantages of eliminating corporate reorganization and auctioning off firms once they file for 
bankruptcy due to advantages of third-party sales). 
114 See The New Face, supra note 1, at 81; supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
115 See Nature of the Firm, supra note 42 (suggesting board of directors, not DIP lenders, control most 
large business reorganizations); Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter II Business 
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replace any existing directors who have not yet resigned once they are in control 
and they will demand the resignation of poorly performing officers, creating the 
presumption that managers will be supervised gives some new owners a slightly 
earlier opportunity to decide whether to replace officers. This affords all creditors 
an opportunity to replace poorly performing officers and directors well before the 
plan is confirmed. 
Finally, giving creditors or new owners the explicit authority to have new 
interim management (such as a CRO) appointed also would help to eliminate some 
of the disconnect between the day-to-day practice in bankruptcy courts (where 
CROs are common, at least in large cases) and the practice as reflected in the Code 
(where CROs are not explicitly authorized) or appellate decisions (where CROs are 
rarely mentioned). 
B. Encouraging Managers to File Earlier Bankruptcy Petitions 
Managers have no incentive to file an early bankruptcy petition because they 
know that, in most instances, they will be replaced or forced to resign116 and any 
ownership interests they have in the firm will become .. virtually worthless. 117 
Moreover, if they know they have violated criminal laws, they will have an 
incentive to delay filing hoping to delay or prevent prosecution. Similarly, if they 
are in the process of misappropriating funds or are attempting to sell their interest in 
the business before filing, they have an incentive to delay to make sure they can 
reap inappropriate financial benefits from the firm before turning it over to creditors 
in bankruptcy. 
To encourage managers to file earlier bankruptcy petitions and to give 
competent directors an incentive to monitor their fellow directors' behavior once a 
firm approaches insolvency, directors should have a duty to file a timely petition. 
Courts should find that they have breached that duty if they fail to place firms in 
bankruptcy within thirty days of either ( 1) when the directors knew that the firm 
would be unable to pay its probable liability on its existing debts as they matured or 
(2) when they knew (or should have known) that the firm's current liabilities 
exceeded the fair market value of its current tangible assets. 118 Directors who breach 
Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trnstees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. I, 23-24 
(1989) (discussing reasons why chapter II usu·ally places officers and directors in operating control during 
reorganization). See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate 
Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. I, 40 (2003) [hereinafter A Behavioral Approach] (urging timely filing 
of bankruptcy duty in order to force directors to consider all interests of firms' constituents). 
116 See supra note Ill and accompanying text. 
117 See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729, 733 (1993) (recognizing 
owner-manager interests in insolvent companies are valued at virtually nothing which may result in owner-
managers taking unjustified risks). But see Atlas, supra note 51, at Cl (reporting shares of one company 
triRled in two months after it filed for relief under chapter II). 
18 I elaborate on these arguments in another article. See generally A Behavioral Approach, supra note 
115, at 42-45 (establishing liability for directors who delay filing for bankruptcy); see also Geyer v. 
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this duty should be fined in an amount equal to three times the highest directors' fee 
paid (or the value of the property given in lieu of a fee) in the three years before the 
filing to force directors to reimburse the business (at least in part) for failing to 
protect it. 119 
Forcing managers to concede early on that the business cannot survive (either 
because it needs to be sold to new owners or needs to radically restructure its debts 
or operating structure) also helps to avoid the final period problem. The final 
period makes managers indifferent to market controls once the firm becomes 
insolvent. This problem arises when a person fears that she is about to lose her job 
and senses that she will be unable to secure equal or better employment. 120 Once the 
firm becomes insolvent, the final period bias will give directors (especially insiders) 
an incentive to engage in high-risk activities to save the firm, as they may know (or 
at least suspect) that their future financial opportunities are limited. That is, inside 
directors of insolvent firms will want to delay filing a bankruptcy petition for the 
firm since most will know (or at least suspect) they will be replaced if the firm files 
for bankruptcy. 121 Similarly, given the damaged reputation that inside directors may 
suffer because of the public scrutiny of their conduct, they will seek to delay the 
filing if they believe there is even a remote chance of saving the business. 122 
As stated earlier, chapter 11 remains designed to help businesses either 
reorganize and continue in business, or liquidate efficiently. Earlier filings should 
increase the likelihood that the business can successfully reorganize, as firms 
Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (supporting insolvency in fact over statutory filing 
. as arpropriate trigger for fiduciary duties towards creditors). 
11 See A Behavioral Approach, supra note 115, at 46 (discussing appropriate penalties for directors failing 
to protect firm); see also Zipora Cohen, Directors' Negligence Liability to Creditors: A Comparative and 
Critical View, 26 1. CORP. L. 351, 352 (2001) (arguing for director liability in close corporations). See 
generally Ramesh K.S. Rao, et al., Fiduciary Duty a Ia Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate 
Governance in a Financially-Distressed Firm, 221. CORP. L. 53, 67 (1996) [hereinafter Duty a Ia Lyonnais] 
(stating directors have little incentive to file for bankruptcy because of self-interested financial motivation to 
avoid losses owed to them by employer). 
120 See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding 
Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L. REv. 1397, 1426 n.132 (2002) (noting managers and shareholders 
interest are not aligned during final period because of job instability and unfavorable market labor 
dynamics); Connected Contracts, supra note 66, at 903 (identifYing managerial incentives to take high risk 
occur when bankruptcy imminent); Gaurang Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is 
Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694 (1999) [hereinafter 
Interim Nondisclosure] (illustrating how bankruptcy lends itself to managerial neglect motivated by fear of 
job loss). 
121 See supra note III; see also Duty a Ia Lyonnais, supra note 119, at 67 (identifYing balancing which 
exist between self-protection and investor interest); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing 
Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1396-97 (2000) 
(discussing why managers faced with insecure employment will attempt to delay filing for bankruptcy even 
if transferring cost to investors). 
122 See Cohen, supra note 119, at 352 (claiming shareholders can replace directors or make corporation 
vulnerable to takeovers); Interim Nondisclosure, supra note 120, at 694-95 (asserting managers no longer 
fear harm to reputation during final-period); see also A Behavioral Approach, supra note 115, at 23 
(indicating directors value prestige and status, and will consider embarrassment and harm to their social 
_-. esteem in corporate decision making). 
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entering chapter 11 which are too highly leveraged often fail to reduce sufficient 
debt in the reorganization to save the company. 123 Likewise, an earlier filing of a 
company that is not as highly leveraged should decrease the likelihood that the 
business will need to file another chapter 11 petition in the future. 124 
C. Debarring Unfit Managers 
Finally, under certain circumstances, incompetent managers who have caused 
harm to the business because of this unfitness should be declared unfit and barred 
from serving on current or future boards. Upon motion of an interested party or the 
court in either a breach of fiduciary duty suit involving an insolvent business or in a 
federal bankruptcy or state receivership proceeding, there should be a rebuttable 
presumption that the directors of insolvent firms are unfit for board service and that 
they should be disqualified from future board service for a period fixed by the 
authority that issues the disqualification order. In determining whether a director is 
presumptively unfit, courts should consider whether greed, sloth, or incompetence 
caused the director to allow the fmancial implosion of the firm. If these factors 
contributed to the director's lax monitoring, he/she should be found unfit for board 
service and should be barred from current and future service. 125 
Relying on market controls or other non-legal remedies to eliminate 
incompetent directors has not worked and will continue to be ineffective. The 
market is not likely to protect shareholders from unfit directors primarily because 
123 See A Behavioral Approach, supra note 115, at 33 (observing empirical data highlight highly leveraged 
firms frequently fail to reduce debt enough in bankruptcy restructuring to emerge as viable concerns); see 
also Race to the Bottom, supra note 104, at 270 (discussing prevalence of serial filings particularly for 
highly leveraged companies who file in Delaware and New York bankruptcy courts); Patterns in 
Reorganization, supra note 110, at 608--09 (revealing data suggesting large companies frequently "emerge 
from Chapter 11 with too much debt" and "the general refiling rate for companies that have emerged from 
Chapter 11 is extraordinarily high."). But cf, Robert Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A 
Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 285-
86, 293-94 (2001) (disputing Lopucki and Kalin's assessment that Delaware's courts allow firms to emerge 
with inordinate debt and hypothesizing any high refiling rate may increase overall social welfare). 
124 See A Behavioral Approach, supra note 115, at 35 n.128 (detailing TWA and Phar-Mor, Inc. as well-
publicized examples of serial filers, and collecting articles on serial refilings); see also Race to the Bottom, 
supra note 104, at 244, 265 (finding debtors who filed in Delaware had higher refiling rates and attributing 
refiling rate to "Delaware bankruptcy court's laissez-faire approach to confirmation."). See generally NoelS. 
Cohen, Note & Comment, Serial Chapter 11 Filings: Finding Method in the Madness, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 
461, 462-63, 485-96 (2001) [hereinafter Serial Chapter 11 Filings] (reviewing background and purpose 
behind multiple chapter 11 filings, and discussing other approaches to determining validity of serial filings); 
James D. Key, Comment, The Advent of the Serial Chapter 11 Filing and Its Implications, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 
245, 255-64 (1991) (detailing early serial chapter 11 cases and courts' responses). 
125 See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Unfit Directors (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). See generally S.E.C. v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court 
"banishment" of defendants from ever "acting as officers or directors of any public company"); Michael 
Dailey, Comment, Officer And Director Bars: Who Is Substantially Unfit To Serve After Sarbanes-Oxley?, 
40 Hous. L. REv. 837, 849-51 (examining court's power to bar directors and officers for "unfitness" under 
section 305 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and noting "Congress wanted to make sure that this 
'extraordinary remedy' was exercised with caution."). 
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shareholders generally lack information about the fitness (or unfitness) of directors. 
Additionally, even with full information, small individual shareholders have no 
incentive to mount an expensive campaign to remove an unfit director or to prevent 
that director from being appointed to a board. 126 Once directors are elected, it takes 
significant effort to have them removed-especially if it is a public business-given 
the large number of shareholders needed to prevent a director from joining a board 
or to call a special meeting to remove one who is already on the board. 127 
Relying on either the market or on business norms to protect the business from 
unfit directors also is problematic, both because the market tends to have a very 
short (and forgiving) memory and because some directors may simply be 
shameless. 128 That is, despite the highly publicized, scandalous financial 
improprieties involving the recent collapse of large and (at that time) reputable 
corporations, 129 some of their directors refused to voluntarily resign from other 
boards, or to decline invitations to join future boards. 130 Likewise, while some 
126 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means And Ends Of Corporate Governance, 97 
Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 558, 569-71 (2003) (observing "most shareholders are rationally apathetic" which 
"precludes small individual shareholders from playing an active role in corporate governance."); see also 
Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders 
in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 32, 51-52, 64 (1989) (noting cumbersome setting 
involved in voting agairist incumbent management in proxy voting even where shareholder is willing to 
undertake costs of challenge); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case For Shareholder Access To The Ballot, 59 
Bus. LAW. 43, 44-45 (2003) (arguing need for reforming corporate elections as "[a]ttempts to replace 
directors are extremely rare" given financial disincentives posed by mounting proxy fights). But see Bernard 
S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 523-25 (1990) (surveying shareholder 
passivity problem and arguing shareholder monitoring of directors fundamentally has not been effectively 
tried). 
127 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.09(a) (1984) ("[A] court ... may remove a director of the corporation 
from office in a proceeding commenced either by the corporation or by its shareholders holding at least I 0 
percent of the outstanding shares of any class if the court finds that (I) the director engaged in fraudulent or 
dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discretion, with respect to the corporation and (2) removal 
is in the best interest of the corporation."); Activist Shareholder Benefit Boards, ISS Panelist Say, INVESTOR 
REL. Bus., Mar. 19, 2001 (advocating appointment of shareholders to boards of directors because of 
personal stake in company, which would protect against bad decisions of independent management). 
128 See, e.g., Joshua Green, Savage Business, AM. PROSPECT, June 17, 2002, at 14 (showing pressure on 
Enron board members to resign positions in other corporations). "[A] vexing dilemma [arose]: What do you 
do when a system governed by shame encounters a business man who's shameless?" Id. But cf, e.g., In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("Skilling ... would rather abandon ship now 
than resign in shame in 2 years."). 
129 See supra notes 85, 91. . 
130 See, e.g, Green, supra note 128, at 14 (depicting story of one stubborn executive, Frank Savage). Frank 
Savage, a former Enron director remained on the boards of Qualcomm and the Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, even after the Enron scandal broke. !d.; see also Jim Hopkins & Edward Iwata, WorldCom 
Directors' Credibility Doubted, USA TODAY, June 11, 2003, at 3B (discussing Frank Savage's resistance to 
resign). Another director, Ronnie Chan, remained the Chair at Hang Lung Group and Motorola. Id.; Rob 
Kaiser, Enron Director to Yield Motorola Seat; Chan Won't Seek Re-election; Foes Step up Pressure, CHI. 
TRIB., Mar. 1, 2002, at 3N; Stephen Seawright, Chan Urged to Drop Overseas Directorships, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Hong Kong), Feb. 15, 2002, at Business Post 3. Former Wor!dCom directors remained on 
the boards of the News Corporation Limited, Valence Technology, CAPCure (Bert Roberts), MicroStrategy 
Incorporated (John Sidgmore), Martek Biosciences Corporation, Medlmmune Inc., and White Mountains 
Insurance Group Limited (Gordon S. Macklin). See Brazilian Bonds up for 2d Day, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 
2002, at E2 (commenting on Bert Robert's retirement); Reed Abelson, Enron's Many Strands: The 
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directors have in the past voluntarily resigned after the SEC investigated their 
companies, many appear to have done so only as part of a settlement with the SEC, 
not because they were shamed into doing so. 131 Because criminal convictions and 
public notoriety do not adequately ensure that incompetent managers will be 
harmed in the market (by losing board compensation) or will be shunned (by being 
automatically removed from, not added to, boards), and because some managers 
appear impervious to shame, another remedy (such as being labeled unfit and barred 
from current and future board service) is needed to help dislodge incompetent 
managers. 
CONCLUSION 
That chapter 11 has one face in mega-cases, a different one in smaller business 
filings and yet another in reported appellate decisions is not such a bad thing. These 
variations prove the flexibility and versatility of chapter 11 and indicate that it will 
be able to handle the wide range of issues raised in both small and large business 
failures for another 25 years. As long as all faces continue to pursue the goal of 
giving organizations time to decide whether to have an orderly liquidation or to 
continue in business (with or without the same owners or the same corporate name 
or form), how the faces allow the pursuit of those goals is largely irrelevant. The 
strength of The New Face is its recognition of these multiple faces and its challenge 
to courts and scholars to ensure that these faces continue to advance the goals and 
policies ofbankruptcy laws. 
Directors; Endgame? Some Enron Board Members Quit or Face Ouster at Other Companies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2002, at C5 (illustrating resilience of corporate directors in keeping positions in other corporations 
after leaving scandalous ones); Shannon Henry, So Many Hats for so Few Heads, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 
2002, at E I (noting circumstances surrounding John Sidgmore's resignation). 
131 See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d. 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (authorizing district court to 
permanently bar bank chairman from acting as officer or director of public company); SEC v. Gulf Res., 
Inc., T.C.M. (CCH) "il 99, 174 (D.D.C. 1983) (ordering compliance with subpoenas duces tecum); SEC v. 
Rusco Indus., Inc., T.C.M. (CCH) "if93, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (enjoining officer from conduct related to his 
conviction for securities fraud). 
